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  The requirement to implement Evidence-Based Design in all military hospital 
development was enacted in 2007.  For almost a decade now, health facility developers 
have been formally educated on what EBD is, and how to apply it in the Military Health 
System.  Many tools, such as the MHS EBD Checklist developed by The Center for 
Health Design, have been developed to assist facility planners in programming the right 
design interventions into the healing space.   However, the trend of military medical 
facilities being delivered consistently behind schedule and over budget suggests that 
military planners are still struggling with EBD implementation, and its associated design 
decisions.   
This qualitative study examined some of the causal factors that result in 
scheduling delays and cost overruns to assess how paramount a role decision-making 
plays in the lack of delivery performance.  In it, three facets of achieving an EBD 
healing environment were investigated: cultural transformation, adapting clinical 
operations, and the EBD built environment, which requires that decisions be made 
relative to how, and why, design interventions are selected to achieve World class 
healthcare. 
The purpose of this research was to investigate how inconsistent decision-making 
is a contributor to the degraded performance in military hospital construction, and 
determine whether Choosing by Advantages, a Lean Construction programming 
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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION  
 
The last decade of military health facility development has been earmarked by 
unprecedented growth.  Due to enduring conflicts in both Iraq and Afghanistan, the need 
for improved quality of healthcare for our nation’s veterans and their families has 
resulted in increased budgets appropriated to military health facility developers to 
achieve “world class healthcare.”   The world class medical facility definition, developed 
by the National Capital Region Base Realignment and Closure Health Systems Advisory 
Subcommittee of the Defense Health Board in May 2009, includes 18 conditions in 6 
domains that must be met for a medical facility to be considered world class (World 
Class Facilities 2017):  
(1) Basic Infrastructure  
(2) Leadership and Culture 
(3) Processes of Care  
(4) Performance  
(5) Knowledge Management  
(6) Community and Social Responsibility 
 
To accomplish this transformational change, senior Department of Defense 
(DOD) leaders implemented programming measures and mandates (Appendix A), such 
as the use of Evidence-Based Design (EBD), to ensure that the quality of care improved 
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and that design and construction practitioners were making smart business decisions that 
would improve the lifecycle performance of design interventions relative to the cost of 
implementation.   These mandates changed the way military designers and developers 
programmed hospitals, and the learning curves for using these techniques were steep.  
Recognizing that implementation would require formal training, program managers 
began sending their workforce through academic institutions to learn how to 
appropriately, and responsibly, implement the tools and techniques that they would be 
charged with using to deliver some the most innovative and efficacious health 
environments in the world.   
The decision of senior health affairs officials to push the implementation of EBD 
was reinforced by a large body of research which suggested that EBD interventions 
improved the quality of care.  In order to achieve the “world class” designation, it only 
stood to reason that the military would turn to Evidence-Based Design to earn that 
moniker.   With the help of Noblis, a nonprofit science, technology, and strategy 
organization, the DOD began defining the scope of application for EBD in the Military 
Health System (MHS).   Malone et al. (2007), working for Noblis on behalf of the DOD, 
authored a publication that became the training manual for health facility developers and 
practitioners to assist in understanding what EBD was, and how to apply it in a military 
medical setting.  She and her team relied heavily on academia and industry to develop 
Evidence-Based Design: Application in the MHS (2007).  In it, they reference Stichler 
and Hamilton’s definition of EBD as “a process for the conscientious, explicit, and 
judicious use of current best evidence from research and practice in making critical 
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decisions, together with an informed client, about the design of each individual and 
unique project (2008, p. 3).”  Malone et al. developed a graphic in which they depict 
three organizational components that must be necessary in order to achieve an evidence- 
based healing environment (Figure 1.1).       
 
 
Designing and constructing an innovative healing space, which uses industry 
best-practices to achieve an optimal environment for wellness, is but one component.   
Along with the evidence-based space is a potentially new operating process that must be 
enacted by the hospital workforce.  Both clinicians and administrative staff must adapt to 
the newly designed space, or face sub-optimal performance in an environment that is 
designed to be used in a different manner than they are perhaps accustomed to.  This 
adaptation is not always so simple, however.  It may be particularly challenging in an 
  Figure 1.1- EBD Healing Environment, adapted from Malone et al. 2007 
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organization such as the military, which is steeped in tradition, hierarchy, and esprit de 
corps.  The EBD component that is perhaps the hardest to achieve is developing the 
transformational leadership that shapes the culture required to function optimally in an 
EBD space.   One author who expertly enumerated the principles of culture that it takes 
to succeed in an EBD environment is Jeffrey Liker.  In The Toyota Way: 14 
Management Principles from the World’s Greatest Manufacturer (2004), Liker itemizes 
the Lean organizational attributes that enable fostering an atmosphere of continuous 
improvement and learning, satisfying customers and eliminating waste, getting quality 
right the first time, and grooming transformational leaders.  These tenets of the Lean 
culture would be necessary to establish in the MHS, if the military were to maximize the 
efficacy of the new EBD hospital facilities.  Recognizing this, the U.S. Army Medical 
Command (MEDCOM) began to emphasize Lean and Six Sigma in all of its hospital 
operations to eliminate waste, minimize mistakes, and ultimately become a High 
Reliability Organization (HRO) in its new high performance environment (HRO 2014).  
This study evaluated military culture, a critical component to the implementation of 
EBD, to assess the feasibility of adopting Lean techniques that, if implemented, will 
ultimately impact the way it makes decisions while planning, programming, and 
operating military hospitals.   
 Unfortunately, when initially implementing these new construction programming 
techniques to apply EBD to military healthcare facilities in 2007, lack of EBD 
understanding existed among stakeholders (Participant A, personal communication, 
January 10, 2017). In spite of that, however, learning has occurred that helps assess the 
 5 
 
changes that need to be made to the system to improve efficiency in the future.  Though 
EBD was not the cause of the performance degradation, it was lack of understanding 
about how to implement EBD, and the significantly increased scope of the projects (with 
corresponding increase in project budget) that added to the probability of poor 
performance. These contracting, programming, management, cultural, administrative 
and budgeting decision errors have resulted in consistent cost overruns and scheduling 
delays of virtually all of the medical facility megaprojects delivered by the DOD since 
2007.   There is not a sole entity to blame, but rather a myriad reasons why the 
government seems to consistently fail to meet their target budgets and time constraints in 
delivering these hospital replacement facilities.   Most of the reasons are beyond the 
control of the actual facility developers, and are systemic issues within the layers of 
bureaucracy that exist at many levels of government.  Among those that are specific to 
the military though, is the unique requirement of the military to frequently move service 
members from one duty to another, to allow for professional growth, and for a free 
exchange of ideas among the diverse workforce.  This practice, however, is detrimental 
to the continuity in decision-making on large, enduring, projects that last five to seven 
years on average, and sometimes longer.   This results in design team turn-over at a rate 
much higher than that seen in the private sector, and runs counter to the teaming 
principles of Lean Construction which, in most cases, require continuity (Zimina et al.  
2012).  This study examined some of the causal factors that contribute to the cost 
overruns and scheduling delays that are prevalent in military health facility development.  
Additionally, it investigated how inconsistent decision-making contributed to the 
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degraded performance in military hospital construction to determine whether or not Lean 
Construction (LC) programming techniques can be used to improve continuity in design 
decision-making.   
 
Research Goal 
This study’s main goal was to determine if a Lean Construction decision-making 
model, called Choosing by Advantages, could be applied to the design and programming 
of military healthcare facilities to improve decision-making.   The semi-structured 
interview questions were designed to assess the applicability of Choosing by Advantages 
as the foundation for a decision framework upon which military health facilities planners 
and developers might systematically base programming and design decisions, relative to 
EBD intervention.   
 
Research Objectives 
 While not the primary effort of the study, the following objectives were also 
researched to get a holistic sense of military healthcare facility development. 
1) Gain a better understanding of the causal factors to cost overruns and 
scheduling delays of military hospital projects 
2) Assess Army culture to determine compatibility, and feasibility, of Lean 
Construction programming implementation using Liker’s Principles 
(Liker 2004)  
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3) Improve understanding of the current state of EBD implementation and 
management of EBD intervention selection 
Definitions  
     To put the thesis into context, it is important to define several key terms so that 
the relationship between the concepts can be understood relative to military health 
facility development. 
 
1) Lean Construction (LC) – “A combination of operational research and practical 
development in design and construction with an adaption of Lean manufacturing 
principles and practices to the construction process. Lean Construction is a project-
based production process concerned with the alignment and holistic pursuit of 
concurrent and continuous improvements in all dimensions of the built and natural 
environment” (Abdelhamid et al. 2008, p.8). The programming methodology tries to 
manage and improve construction processes with minimum cost and maximum value 
by considering customer needs (Koskela et al. 2002). 
2) Target Value Design (TVD) – A strategic project delivery method designed to 
reduce cost and maximize value by implementing a more team-centric approach 
when making design decisions on behalf of a client. TVD is an LC cost 
programming technique that was adapted from a proven manufacturing practice, 
which is used to manage cost variability during new product development, called 
Target Costing (Zimina et al.  2012). 
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3) Choosing by Advantages (CBA) – A subcomponent of TVD and a decision making 
tool developed by Jim Suhr (1999).  The method can help construction planners 
visualize why, and on what basis, they are making a decision, based on the 
Importance of the Advantages between alternatives,  while enabling them to capture 
that decision numerically (Parrish and Tommelein 2009). 
4) Evidence-Based Design (EBD) – “A process for the conscientious, explicit, and 
judicious use of current best evidence from research and practice in making critical 
decisions, together with an informed client, about the design of each individual and 
unique project” (Stichler and Hamilton 2008, p.3).  EBD implementation has been 


















The EBD Mandate 
 The entire Military Health System (MHS), only part of which the U.S. Army 
manages, is undergoing transformational change to achieve world class healthcare 
capability.  Consequently, the entire DOD’s medical infrastructure is being substantially 
adapted using proven, Evidence-Based Design interventions from throughout the 
healthcare industry to achieve that goal.  Researchers from Texas A&M University, the 
Georgia Institute of Technology, and industry partners with The Center for Health 
Design (CHD) have been pivotal in developing an “EBD Checklist” (Appendix B) for 
planners and developers to consider using while programming a new health facility 
project (MHS 2010).  However, even when implemented, little data exists capturing the 
effectiveness of these Military EBD interventions.  Furthermore, little guidance or 
standardization exists to evaluate and shape the prioritization of these design decisions.  
It is critically important, in our current fiscally constrained environment, for medical 
planners to implement and invest in the right designs to address the specific problems 
plaguing today’s military demographic.   
 In 2007, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs (Dr. William 
Winkenwerder), drafted a Memorandum for Record (Appendix A) to the General Officer 
Commanders of Engineering Operations in the Armed Services, mandating the 
implementation of Evidence-Based Design in all Military Medical Treatment Facilities 
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(MTF) within the Military Health System (Winkenwerder 2007).   This prompted 
significant changes to the programming specifications and budget appropriations of 
hospital facility development.  Specifically, the U.S. Army’s Health Facilities Planning 
Agency (HFPA) was tasked with the oversight and commissioning of these new EBD 
implementations for Army health facilities in the absence of standardized decision 
matrices to guide them in managing these new requirements.    
The HFPA’s primary role is to serve as the U.S. Army Surgeon General’s 
contracting agent and user representative for health facility development.  The 
organization consists of a consortium of architects, engineers, project managers, and 
construction management professionals whose primary job is the planning, 
programming, design, and construction of military medical treatment facilities (MTFs) 
and medical research facilities.  The organization is charged with the oversight of the 
capital improvement portfolio for all of MEDCOM’s medical infrastructure.  These 
buildings house the personnel who provide the general health, dental, veterinary, 
research, and rehabilitative care for all of the U.S. Army’s Soldiers, retirees, and their 
beneficiaries.  Consequently, the director of the HFPA also serves as the Assistant Chief 
of Staff for Facilities, is special staff to the Army Surgeon General, and handles all 
manner of medical facility capital investment and improvement.  This includes 
managing plans and programs not only for the facilities’ design and construction, but 
also for the maintenance, repair, energy management and sustainability of both the 




Divisions of the HFPA 
While all members of the HFPA play an important role in the development of a 
hospital, four divisions are of particular importance with respect to design and material 
or equipment selection decisions that must be made on a daily basis, and should apply 
the tenets of Evidence-Based Design to those decisions.  They are the Project Execution 
Division (PED); the Planning, Programming, and Support Division (PP&SD); the 
Restoration and Modernization Division (RMD); and the Sustainment Management 
Division (SMD).  The members of these divisions were the target subjects interviewed 
for the purpose of this study. 
 
 
            Figure 2.0 – HFPA Organizational Chart 
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The PED is the division which establishes health facility project offices on-site 
during new health facility construction.  Their focus as field representatives, in addition 
to providing the Office of the Surgeon General (OTSG) with quality assurance of major 
capital investments, is communicating and coordinating medical project requirements to 
construction contract partners.  Upon construction completion, they manage the Initial 
Outfitting & Transition (IO&T) budget to assist the MTF Commander in procuring and 
integrating thousands of pieces of medical equipment into the new facility.  This process 
is extremely complex, and one that can introduce variability in the projects’ time and 
budget if design decisions and material selections are made very late in the delivery 
process.  Many of these decisions, such as room orientation, or medical equipment 
chosen, are based on the users’ personal taste and previous experience (Participant C, 
personal communication, January 12, 2017).  As is often the case, due to the long 
duration of a MTF construction project, it is not uncommon that the MTF Commander 
position be filled by two or three different Commanders over the course of construction.  
These MTF Commanders effectively serve as ad hoc members of the design team, and 
are representing the end users of the space in making decisions.  As one might imagine, 
personal preference in space utilization, layout, and equipment selection can differ 
considerably from one Commander to the next.  The PED Field Representative must 
artfully balance changes that are requested by an incoming MTF Commander, while 
delivering a product that adheres to the principles of EBD.   
 The Project Planning & Support Division (PP&SD) serves as the HFPA’s capital 
investment planner.  Most of the Architectural and Engineering (A&E) support resides in 
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the PP&SD.  This division is involved in the Evidence-Based Design of several key 
areas of Department of Defense Medical Military Construction (MILCON).   Chief 
among those are the Modernization, Repair & Renewal (MRR), and the Sustainment, 
Restoration and Modernization (SRM) programs which they manage in concert with the 
Restoration and Modernization Division (RMD).  The members of the RMD are co-
located with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in what are called Medical Support 
Teams.  What makes SRM particularly challenging is that the renewal and renovation 
budgets are often more constrained than those granted to new hospital replacement 
facility projects.  Detailed Return on Investment (ROI) analysis and Life Cycle Cost 
Analysis (LCCA) must be done to ensure that funds are not misappropriated on a 
dilapidated building that does not have enough life left to recoup the renovation 
investment.  An additional challenge is that in these projects, the planners and 
programmers are often constrained to the existing footprint of the obsolete building, and 
sometimes limited to retaining the antiquated building systems.  Providing world class 
healthcare in a space that was not originally designed to do so can be an architectural 
and engineering feat that requires forward thinking designers and an immense amount of 
coordination.  As with any renovation, the time and budgetary margins of error are 
small, and A&E professionals often uncover undiagnosed conditions after taking on the 
project that must be addressed from a patient safety standpoint.  This can quickly lead to 
cost overruns and scheduling delays. 
 The Sustainment Management Division (SMD) is responsible for the policy and 
oversight of sustainment activities, including the Federal Energy Management Program 
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(FEMP) and Energy Conservation Investment Program (ECIP), throughout the entire 
MEDCOM footprint.  They administer and fund the energy and sustainment policy, 
working closely with the Defense Health Agency and the Environmental Protection 
Agency to track and manage energy and sustainability initiatives such as Leadership in 
Energy and Environmental Design (LEED) Certification, and Health Readiness 
Platforms (HRP) Certification through The Joint Commission (TJC).  The SMD is also 
the proponent, and provides subject matter expertise, for TJC accreditation.  In general, 
the SMD insures that Army medical facilities are in top performing condition by 
managing regularly scheduled and preventative maintenance contracts.  A key 
component of the SRM, from an Evidence-Based Design perspective, is that much of the 
data required to assess the efficacy of design, resides in databases managed by SMD.  
Because they manage the Reliability Centered Maintenance (RCM) program, they 
maintain the logistic software to manage wearable items, and failure prone components 
such as carpeting, tile, and wall coverings.  With these databases, SMD’s technical team 
can assist project integrators with space planning, critical infrastructure deficiencies, and 
initial outfitting requirements.  Through their Defense Medical Logistics Standard 
Support (DMLSS) database and its companion software suite, BUILDER, which the 2D 
AutoCAD as-built drawings are fed into (an effort is underway to use BIM models in the 
near future), they can monitor the health and wellness of MEDCOM’s buildings, while 
tracking real-time consumption in power, water, and sewage through a system of sensors 
and meters installed on the buildings themselves. Figure 2.1 depicts a screenshot of the 
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Facility Management capability of DMLSS, which is an important database from which 




Since the 2007 EBD mandate (Appendix A), the Army has built seven Hospital 
Replacement Facilities, and renovated numerous existing MTFs, implementing the 
mandated EBD interventions.  Thus, there are now military hospitals that are operating 
in the new EBD environment from which to draw performance conclusions, and base 
design decisions.  However, a conceptual framework still needs to be developed on 
which to systematically base EBD decisions during programming phases of future 
Medical Treatment Facility construction.  In addition to measuring the right metrics to 
validate the efficacy of design, the method that is used to capture the rationale for the 
design decision is important, because preserving the ideas behind the decisions help 
bridge the knowledge gap created when military members transfer off the job, and new 
Figure 2.1 – DMLSS Facility Management, reprinted from Office of the Under Secretary of  
                    Defense for Acquisition (DMLSS 2017)  
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construction programmers and planners are moved onto it.  There are many tools at the 
facility planner and programmer’s disposal to make design decisions and material 
selections now, but none captures the true value of those design decisions, neither in the 
business sense (from an ROI perspective), nor from an impact to patient health 
perspective.  The “EBD Checklist” (Appendix B), for instance, was designed to organize 
and categorize the different principles of Evidence-Based Design, and give the facility 
planner some research proven options to consider using when trying to achieve a specific 
design driver.   The shortcoming of a clearing house of many options is that it cannot 
deduce which of those options are the best fit for a specific project when time, cost, and 
quality factors are taken into account.  Another tool at the military health facility 
developer’s disposal are products referred to as design “guide plates” which are 
companion drawings of medical suites to be used with written specifications.  The latest 
revision of these medical design templates was developed in January, 2015 to 
accommodate changes to the Unified Federal Code (UFC) 4-510-01, which are the 
specifications to which all military medical facilities must be built.  These design guide 
plates, available in .pdf or .rvt (AutoDesk® Revit – BIM) files on the DOD’s Whole 
Building Design Guide web portal, are a great design point of departure for a modularly 
designed hospital space (WBDG 2017).   However, these are only a suggested orientation 
and space utilization for most spaces, and material selection decisions and orientation 
must be developed and refined for each specific hospital.  Figure 2.2 depicts an example 
of a design guide plate for an Exam Room, and Figure 2.3, a companion guide plate, 







Figure 2.2 – MHS Design Guide Plate for Exam Room, reprinted from the Whole Building Design  






Additionally, when new technologies emerge, such as high performance wall coatings 
that reduce Hospital Acquired Infection for example, the decision to use these materials 
are often made in the field, long after the design guide plate was crafted.   So how does a 
Figure 2.3 – MHS Design Guide Plate for Exam Room Equipment, reprinted from the Whole  
                    Building Design Guide (WBDG 2017). 
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facility planner and programmer decide which of the Evidence-Based Design 
interventions to implement to achieve the desired high-performance health environment?  
How does one evaluate the life cycle advantages per invested dollar of one over another?  
 
Lean Construction  
Evidence-Based Design decisions are made on construction sites, and in design 
studios across the globe every day.   The speed, accuracy, clarity, and ultimate 
effectiveness of those decisions vary considerably from one firm and one project to the 
next, however.  The Lean Construction community advocates for a collaborative 
decision-making environment, where all stakeholders are brought into the planning 
phases of design very early in the project (Zimina et al. 2012).  This spawns creativity 
and bottom-up refinement of ideas by the trade-craft team members, end users, and 
OEAC enterprises alike.  In an LC management practice called Target Value Design 
(TVD), which is a strategic project delivery method designed to reduce cost and 
maximize value, researchers promote a more team-centric approach when making design 
decisions (Zimina et al.  2012).  TVD is an LC cost programming technique that was 
adapted from a proven manufacturing practice, that is  used to manage cost variability 
during new product development, called Target Costing.  In this novel, construction 
specific costing concept, presented in Target value design: using collaboration and a 
Lean approach to reduce construction cost, Zimina et al. (2012) research twelve 
construction projects that apply TVD to deduce the specific benefits, downfalls, and 
organizational requirements necessary to execute TVD. They contend that TVD’s main 
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goal is “to make a client’s value (specific design criteria, cost, schedule, and 
constructability) a driver of design, thereby reducing waste and satisfying, or even 
exceeding the client’s expectations” (Zimina et al. 2012, p. 387).  In order to accomplish 
this, however, they make some key observations about project organization and risk 
management.  The first is that there must be full engagement of the entire team in the 
design process, and there must be continuity in the staff in order to retain the knowledge 
necessary to base future decisions. Additionally, the team must embrace an “all-for-one” 
mentality with respect to risk versus reward, and the decisions must be collaborative in 
order for TVD to work (Zimina et al. 2012).  While they do not cite any specific 
contractual organizations that are incompatible with TVD, they do suggest a team-
centric organization and delivery method, such as the Integrated Form of Agreement 
(IFOA) or perhaps Public Private Partnership (P3), which may be more naturally 
conducive to the success of TVD as a cost programming method (Zimina et al. 2012).  
Again, the goal of this managerial tool is to minimize waste, and make design decisions 
that maximize value to the customer, thereby bringing cost down.  A subcomponent of 
TVD, and the method of making informed design decisions to reduce waste as a design 
team, is a tool called Choosing by Advantages (CBA). 
Waste in the healthcare industry comes in many forms, including (but not limited 
to) waste of motion, conveyance, time (waiting), inventory, overproduction, errors 
(defects) and processing (Sullivan, Smith, Derr and Davey 2011).  These wastes are, in 
fact, party to the stressors that both patients and clinical providers are subjected to in the 
hospital environment.  What is worse is that these wastes are sometimes designed into 
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the building.  One of the tenets of Lean is the eradication of waste, thereby enabling the 
seamless execution of tasks, or processes, without barriers to progress (Ballard 2008).  A 
critical component of Lean Construction is the breaking down of barriers through 
innovative design such that the end user can more effectively execute his or her tasks, 
and derive increased value from the designed space.   This maximization of value is 
accomplished by employing various Lean programming techniques, but at the heart of 
this research project is Target Value Design and its decision-making subcomponent 
called Choosing by Advantages. Some researchers believe the collaborative, Lean 
programming approach, when coupled with EBD, has redefined the way we understand 
what healthcare practitioners deem truly valuable in a healthcare facility over the long-
term (Rybkowski et al. 2012).   
The waste that was investigated in this study is caused, in part, by the frequent 
personnel turn-over that military hospital projects are often plagued with, and the 
resultant loss of continuity in decision-making.  The virtually constant turn-over results 
in changes being made very late in the delivery process due to differing opinions, 
viewpoints, and personal bias of incoming design team members or new facility 
commanders.  This results in a proverbial two steps forward, one step back approach to 
building hospitals that negatively impacts both time and cost.  In a military hospital 
programming application, Choosing by Advantages may serve as a bridging strategy 
between design team members to promote continuity in decision-making.   Inconsistent 
decision-making, without capturing the rationale for design decisions, is partly to blame 
for scheduling delays and cost overruns due to lack of shared understanding, and lack of 
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clear intent, or prioritization of design interventions.  The best way to overcome late 
change requests on a project, is to develop a network of decision makers who can adhere 
to the agreed upon design implementation, and show the critical analysis (CBA) that was 
performed by the team, to refute the need for a late change order. 
By validating a more structured decision-making process in selecting EBD 
interventions, the business objective of this study is to propose a way to save time, 
money, and energy during the pre-construction phase of MHS health facility 
development, such that those resources can be appropriated elsewhere. Choosing by 
Advantages, developed by Jim Suhr (1999), can improve clarity and transparency in 
decision-making.  In construction, its benefits have been cited by LC pioneers as 
enabling construction planners to visualize why, and on what basis, they are making a 
decision, while enabling them to capture that decision numerically (Parrish and 
Tommelein 2009).  When choosing between two alternatives, CBA’s goal is to base 
decisions on the Importance (weighted value) of Advantages, rather than on “pros and 
cons,” or simply on advantages versus disadvantages (Abraham et al. 2013).  A research 
objective of this study is to apply the tenets of Choosing by Advantages to an EBD 
decision, to assess whether or not it may help the HFPA become more efficient in the 
evaluation and application of EBD interventions in the military health environment. 
The efficiency achieved through Lean Construction, though not a universally 
accepted practice in the construction industry, is hard to refute.  The practice of 
analyzing process, and flow, early in the programming phases of design and 
construction, with the involvement of the end user, is cited as a tangible benefit to Lean 
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Construction, and a departure from more traditional health facility delivery methods 
employed by the United States Army Health Facility Planning Agency (Ballard 2008).  
Thus, this study explored through semi-structured interview the application of a Lean 
Construction technique that has been shown to improve efficiency in decision-making, 
to determine if it may help to eradicate the waste in MTFs that hinder the military 
planner’s ability to maximize the environment’s healing and rehabilitative potential, and 
leads to poor cost and schedule performance. 
 
Background to the Research Design 
The issue of cost overruns and scheduling delays in delivering military hospitals 
is a complex and multi-facetted problem.   On its face, it may seem as though military 
health facility developers are simply poor project managers, and inefficient executers of 
work due to lack of experience or training.  That could not be further from the truth.  In 
fact, the military has an established pipeline for the professional development of its A&E 
workforce to achieve higher performance, and to stay abreast of the emerging 
technologies in the construction field.  While the design and construction professionals 
bear some of the performance responsibility, the delays and missed cost targets are also 
due to many other reasons including a complicated, hierarchical governmental structure, 
timeliness of budget appropriations, and the checks and balances imposed by the U.S. 
Congress to insure the responsible use of taxpayer dollars.   Add to that the EBD 
requirement, which prompted retraining with an associated change to the health facility 
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design schema, and it led to a tumultuous roll-out of the first military world class 
healthcare facilities.  
This phenomena is not uncommon of governmental megaprojects it seems. A 
Danish professor, and co-author of Megaprojects and Risk, Bent Flyvbjerg, concluded 
that “cost overruns of 50 percent to 100 percent in real terms are common in public 
megaprojects (Flyvbjerg et al. 2003, p.136).”  As a leading authority on public project 
cost overruns, Flyvbjerg et al. (2002) paint a bleak and ominous outlook on the reasons 
for target cost failure on governmental projects in Underestimating Costs in Public 
Works Projects: Error or Lie?  In that study, the authors examined 258 public 
transportation projects, executed in 20 different countries, and found that 90 percent 
were over budget.  Though investigating a different market (transportation), the reasons 
cited in those cases may have applicability in the military health facility arena as well.  
Some of these reasons will be queried as part of an interview process of HFPA subject 
matter experts in this study. The causes include (Flyvbjerg et al. 2002): 
 Strategic Misrepresentation (The main cause according to the authors); 
 The costs of materials, labor, or other inputs may change in unexpected 
ways over long execution timelines; 
 Unforeseen environmental or geological issues may arise; 
 Federal agencies do not have to earn profits, so they have little reason to 
restrain costs; 
 On government projects, there are few consequences if funds are not used 
efficiently (the projects are typically given additional funds to get well); 
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 Federal employees’ pay is generally tied to longevity, not performance; 
 Contractors know that low bids will help win federal business; they have 
an incentive to underestimate project costs knowing that is only a “floor”; 
 Politicians are spending taxpayer money, which they do not spend as 
carefully as their own (in fact, long, enduring projects in their voting 
districts mean a favorable job market for voting constituents); and 
 Decisions made early in the project planning phases do not have validity 
when they are finally executed (circumstances influencing the decision 
change) 
The authors cite “Strategic Misrepresentation,” which they define as project 
promoters, such as special interest groups, consultants, and politicians, creating pressure 
for governmental project planners to lower their initial cost estimates in order to garner 
public support, as the main reason for cost overruns (Flyvbjerg et al.  2003). They point 
to the consistency, and high percentage of the costing error to the high side as proof of 
unscrupulous intent.   Flyvbjerg et al. claim that governmental project estimators and 
managers could not possibly be so obtuse as to underestimate their projects so 
consistently.  If it were “an honest mistake,” the ratio of cost overruns to projects that 
came in under budget would be more normally distributed:  an equal ratio of under-








In an Ishikawa Fishbone diagram (Figure 3.1), adapted for military healthcare 
facilities, it illustrates some assumptions of this research regarding the reasons for cost 
overruns and scheduling delays, based on Flyvbjerg et al.  It should be noted that while 
this list of causes is likely valid, not all of these reasons for poor performance in military 
hospital delivery have been researched and confirmed, through actual analysis, to be 
relevant.  This Fishbone Diagram is populated with anecdotal evidence based on 





The causal component of the cost overruns and scheduling delays explored more 
deeply was the EBD decision-making process.  This was due to an assumption about the 
span of control that the military health facility developer has within their sphere of 
influence.  The intent of this study was to make recommendations that could affect 
change at the practitioner level.  The high-level, systemic issues that are prevalent 
throughout the upper echelons of government are outside the scope of this study, and 
ones that the military health facility developer could not easily effect.     
 
Method 
Through semi-structured interviews (Salazar, personal communications, 
December 20, 2016- January 20, 2017) the intent of this exploration was to understand 
where subject matter experts within the Health Facilities Planning Agency felt the 
organization had evolved with respect to EBD implementation, design decision-making, 
and organizational culture since the 2007 EBD mandate.  Ten professionals were 
selected from a cross-section of the organization which included representation from the 
four targeted divisions of the HFPA (Table 2.0 – Bottom Tier).  As was noted in the 
Chapter II, the divisions assumed to have the most working knowledge of EBD in 
practice were the PED, the PP&SD, the RMD, and the SMD.   Thus, seven of the 
interviews were conducted in person (face-to-face) with experts assigned to Joint Base 
San Antonio’s contingent of the HFPA staff, while the other three were conducted with 
members of the HFPA headquarters in Falls Church, Virginia.   Due to travel and 
budgetary constraints, the three interviews conducted with members in Falls Church, VA 
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were conducted via telephone.   Prior to the interviews, an excerpt of the proposal for 
this project was sent to the subjects detailing what CBA was, and how it was used, 
entitled “CBA Read-Ahead” (pages 36-40 of this thesis) .  This gave each subject a 
foundational understanding of the decision-making method, and an idea of how it may 
be applied to design decisions in military medical construction.  Additionally, a series of 
questions (Appendix C) was provided that might be discussed during the interview 
portion of the visit, and each participant was informed that the conversation was not 
limited to only those questions, and that the subjects themselves could choose the 
direction, and breadth of content coverage during the interview. 
The interviews were essentially conducted in two parts.  The first part was an 
exercise to gauge the potential utility of CBA as a tool to improve clarity in EBD 
decision-making, and as a medium to capture the reason for EBD decisions in order to 
help bridge the decision-making continuity gap generated by personnel turn-over.   The 
second part was a conversation in which the interviewer and subject discussed their 
general thoughts on CBA, and on EBD as a whole.  The intent was to gauge the 
participants’ understanding of EBD implementation requirements, level of responsibility 
relative to making design or programming decisions, their impressions of Army health 
facility culture, and problems that they felt were hindering productivity.  The 
observations were captured in a legal note pad over the course of the approximately one 





Development of Hypothetical CBA Exercise  
 In order to assess whether or not the Choosing by Advantages method was 
perceived to improve the level of understanding, visualization, and analytic capability of 
an EBD decision, a realistic CBA exercise was generated.   It was important that a real-
world design problem was presented to the participants to convey practicality, and 
applicability.  Thus, a hypothetical design decision was chosen for the exercise based on 
a relevant evidence-based issue that currently exists in military hospitals.  In Table 3.2, 
results of an HCAHPS survey question were recorded from 2011 to 2015.  The answers 
to Question #9: How often was the area around your room quiet at night?, indicate that 
noise pollution in military hospitals is problematic.  The percentages indicate the average 
of all respondents’ ratings of the quietness of the hospital environment.  As an example, 
in 2014 at the San Antonio MEDCEN, survey participants reported that the area around 
their room was quiet for only 65% of the night time period. 
 
Table 3.2 – MHS Inpatient Experience Metric  
 
 
Adapted from U.S. Department of Defense MHS Report, 2012-2015 
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The metrics depicted in Table 3.2 drove the decision to develop a CBA exercise that 
would analyze three options for a high-performance wall, such that a facility planner 
would choose a design implementation to combat the transmission of sound through 
patient rooms.   As was mentioned previously, an evidence-based material solution is 
only one component of achieving the desired healing environment.  For example, a 
patient room constructed of high-performance walls must be accompanied by an 
operationally noise conscious staff, whose leadership establish a culture of respect for 
patients’ peace and quiet.   Table 3.3 illustrates that the built environment is not a single-
















Table 3.3 – Three Domains of an EBD Healing Space to Combat Noise 
Adapted from DHA-Health Report Opportunities for Design, presentation by COLI Eileen 
Malone on 2 FEB 16 
 
 
This study ascertained the degree to which the subjects felt that there is clarity in 
EBD decision-making while planning, programming, and constructing military hospitals.  
Additionally, the research determined the extent to which existing data collection 
platforms can be used to develop weighted Importance of Advantages (IofA’s) of EBD 
interventions within the MTF built environment by discussing data collection efforts, 
and post-occupancy evaluation with the subjects.   Existing data collection instruments 
include a litany of nationally accredited, but independent surveys such as: the Healthcare 
Effectiveness Data and Information Set (HEDIS
®
), ORYX National Hospital Quality 
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Measures, Hospital Consumer Assessment of Healthcare Providers and Systems, etc.  
These assessments attempt to capture the patient satisfaction aspects of the healthcare 
environment, but this is only a portion of the necessary evaluation criteria for choosing 
between design interventions.  Subsequently, questions were asked to determine if the 
logistics data currently being collected through systems like DMLSS can be used to 
extract metrics that could also be used as evaluation criteria in a CBA matrix to compare 
design alternatives.   In order to recommend CBA for implementation by the Health 
Facilities Planning Agency in evaluating EBD options, the research evaluated whether 
sufficient measurable data is being collected to develop a CBA table with credible 
evaluation criteria across the five principles of EBD that the MHS has adopted.  Those 
principles are (Malone et al. 2007):  
 Create a Patient and Family-Centered Environment 
 Improve the Quality and Safety of Healthcare 
 Enhance Care of the Whole Person (Contact with Nature & Positive 
Distractions) 
 Create a Positive Work Environment 
 Design for Maximum Standardization, Future Flexibility and Growth 
 
The following are brief descriptions of some of the survey instruments** that 
were reviewed, and combined with stakeholder feedback, to develop the test CBA 
matrix that was introduced to the subjects during the interview.   These instruments,  
 
** Extracted from the Military Health System Final Report dated August 29, 2014 
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along with post-occupancy evaluation data, and metrics harvested from facility databases 
like DMLSS served to provide the evaluation criteria (data input) for the CBA table. 
 Healthcare Effectiveness Data and Information Set (HEDIS
®
): The 
MHS compares its performance in selected measures against national 
HEDIS
® 
benchmarks for this measure set, which is utilized by more than 
90 percent of health plans in the United States. 
 ORYX National Hospital Quality Measures: ORYX is a set of measures 
used by TJC in its hospital accreditation process, in which all military 
hospitals participate. 
 Experience of Care: The experience of care measures use survey data to 
determine beneficiary satisfaction with MHS health care. AHRQ CAHPS 
and Hospital Consumer Assessment of Healthcare Providers and Systems 
(HCAHPS) comparable questions were used to allow comparison to 
civilian systems and benchmarks. 
The data harvested from the instruments listed above were cross-walked through 
ROI analysis tables developed by The Center for Health Design (CHD) and the Georgia 
Institute of Technology and marketed as the “Evidence-Based Design Leader’s Toolkit” 
and the “MHS EBD Checklist v2.2” in the whitepaper series entitled The Business Case 
for Building Better Hospitals Through Evidence-Based Design (Sadler et al. 2008).  By 
doing so, a hypothetical CBA table was developed with reasonable evaluation criteria to 
apply to a CBA demonstration exercise during the semi-structured interviews.   The 
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intent of the exercise was for the researcher to critically analyze how each subject truly 
assigns value to a specific EBD intervention, and then ask a series of questions to 
ascertain the degree to which the exercise helped the subject understand the reason for 
their decision.  Additionally, the application would demonstrate how conducting the 
practice CBA exercise enabled the decision maker to capture the rationale for their 
individually scaled Importance of Advantages.   This ability to capture and analyze the 
decision rationale is a key component of CBA that may help overcome a trend of late 
change requests on military hospital construction projects which implement EBD due, in 
part, to frequent personnel turn-over. 
The MHS EBD Checklist v2.2 (Appendix B) was used as the backbone of the 
notional CBA decision table.  This checklist, developed by the Center for Health Design 
(CHD) for the military, lists the various design interventions that should be considered to 
achieve a desired healthcare goal.  For instance, if an owner desires to improve the stress 
reduction aspects of their health facility, the designer and project programmers can, 
through the MHS EBD Checklist, access a list of interventions (with its supporting 
research) to help achieve that end state.  For stress reduction, the list includes 
interventions such as providing positive distraction (art, music, views of nature), noise 
reduction through high performance building materials, central “green zones” (atriums) 
to provide a soothing respite from the hospital atmosphere, and interior design elements 
that belie the spaces’ true purpose as a hospital.  A design challenge exists due to budget 
constraints in hospital facility development, particularly in those projects classified as 
Modernization, Repair and Renewal (MRR) projects.   When constructing a Hospital 
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Replacement Facility, it is far easier to program all of the listed EBD interventions into 
the project to achieve the desired performance end state.  In MRR projects, careful 
selection of interventions is more critical in order to maximize the desired effect within 
the constraints of the existing footprint (in most cases) and the planned obsolescence of 
the building. 
One objective of the study was to provide a proof of concept for a decision-
making system that may aid designers and developers of military health facilities in 
prioritizing interventions and appropriating money.  To do so, a Choosing by 
Advantages table (Table 3.4) was developed for one “Design Driver” (MHS Goal).  The 
Design Driver that was investigated was Reduce Stress, which has three EBD 
subcomponents, or categories:  provide positive distraction, provide access to nature, and 
reduce noise (according to the EBD Checklist v2.2).  Through review of existing 
performance measurement tools and a series of interviews with senior Army Health 
Facility Developers, the researcher developed the criteria by which to evaluate the 
alternative interventions within each category.   In the interview(s) with each subject, 
that particular participant’s Importance of Advantage scale, which yielded a 
prioritization of available alternatives within each category, and ultimately determined 
the efficacy of the tables in aiding a design decision relative to the Design Driver.  Table 
3.4 is the interview example of a CBA table for the MHS goal: Reduce Stress-Noise 
Reduction.  In a practical application, a design consultant would apply this table while 
working to assist an owner or space user in choosing between three options of high-
performance wall with a Sound Transmission Class (STC) rating of between 50 and 60.   
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In Table 3.4, three high-performance walls are being evaluated for use in a standard 300 
SF patient room.  The evaluation criteria (variable criteria developed as a design team 
for a specific decision), by which the three wall options are to be compared, are in the far 
left-hand column of the table. 
 
Table 3.4 – High Performance Wall Comparison 
 
 
                   
After capturing the comparison criteria of each wall, analysis was done to 
determine the difference in the advantages.  Meaning, the “best” value for each of the 
criteria was identified, and the difference in the other options, or alternatives, was 
annotated (Table 3.5).  Note that all values in bold (right justified in the column) are the 
difference between the “best” value in that evaluation criteria category and the value of 






Table 3.5 – High Performance Wall CBA Table                       
                 
            
The next step was to work closely with the stakeholder to develop their scaled 
Importance of Advantages for each alternative option.   Each participant plotted the 
differences found in Table 3.5 (for this example) on a CBA Importance Scale.  This 
process was subjective, and captured each subject’s personal perceptions of the value of 
each of the differences between alternatives.   In order to baseline the scalar plot of each 
of the differences, the subject was asked to identify which value they deem most critical.  
This value was placed at “100 %” along the CBA Importance Scale, and all other values 
were plotted relative to this “most critical” value.   The scores generated from the CBA 
Importance Scale were plugged back into the High Performance Wall CBA Table to 
generate a score for that option.  In Figure 3.6, the CBA Importance Scale, hypothetical 
values are placed on each of the differences for illustration purposes.  The subject in this 
example selected Payback Period as the most critical value on the scale, and all other 
 38 
 




    Figure 3.6– High Performance Wall CBA Importance Scale 
 
 After plotting the values on the CBA Importance Scale, the numerical values 








Table 3.7 – High Performance Wall CBA Table with Scores 
  
                  
 At first glance, it may seem obvious which of the alternatives clearly possesses 
the most value.  However, the final step was to graph the score in relation to the cost.  In 
Choosing by Advantages, maximum value is achieving the most advantage per invested 






Cost per Square Foot ($) 
Figure 3.8 – High Performance Wall Weight of Importance Graph 
  
In spite of having the highest numerical score (a value of 380 points), Option 3 
did not provide the most value.  In this example, the recommendation to the stakeholder 
would be to install Option 1:  The 16 Gauge Staggered Metal Stud wall with two layers 
of standard Gypsum Wallboard (double layer on both sides), and blown-in Cellulose 
Insulation.   
 In actual practice, this process would be repeated for many of the other critical 
Evidence-Based Design interventions that the designer felt could reduce noise such as 
sound attenuating ceiling tiles, and impact noise reduction flooring.  It is important to 
note that some of these interventions, when coupled together, can have a synergistic 
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effect on improving the healing space, and CBA is not meant to pit one against another 
(Hamilton 2010).  This process will enable a facility developer to help shape a 
stakeholder’s design selections by aiding the visualization and critical analysis of “what 
really matters.” The intent is to gain a better understanding of how each stakeholder truly 
assigns value to each specific Design Driver.   By taking a holistic approach to “Reduce 
Noise,” a developer can build “packages” of EBD interventions to achieve the design 
goal while capturing the rationale for the decisions a set of CBA tables.  This analysis 
would be preserved for future planning and programming of Military Health Facilities.  
The end-state of this project was to determine if CBA is a viable tool on which to base 
an EBD decision-making system.   If deemed viable, the long-term vision of this project 
was to iteratively develop the CBA Table 3.5, which evaluates one Design Driver, into a 
series of pre-constructed CBA tables to aid the developer in consultation of EBD 
interventions. The intent in doing so is to establish a framework for implementing 
Choosing by Advantages as a broader decision-making tool in Military Health Facility 
Development.  This system of decision-making (and decision-shaping) offers the 
potential to build a comprehensive plan of action to achieve the MHS goal of Reduce 
Stress, and validates a model that can be used to aid designers and developers of military 










The ten subject matter experts had similar opinions and experiences with respect 
to the challenges they faced as an organization, in spite of their various specialties, duty 
stations, and assigned divisions within the HFPA.  The organizational cohesion seemed 
tight, and the morale was quite high, which resulted in the “problems” stated sounding 
like constructive criticism, rather than complaints.  It was evident from the description of 
the projects executed that there was particular pride taken in their product, which is not 
always seen in military units that provide a service, rather than those that produce, or 
develop, an idea from inception through tangible fruition like the HFPA.    
During the interviews, field notes were taken capturing the responses to some of 
the questions that were sent in advance.   Some of the participants had particular 
interests in specific areas of the research, which led to only three questions (of the 9 
questions presented) being answered by all ten of the participants.  In almost all cases, 
the participants dwelled on the topics that they were most familiar with based on their 
assigned duty within the HFPA (which was expected).  It was for this reason that a 
cross-section of the organization was selected to participate.    
An unexpected aspect of the study which resulted in fewer questions being 
answered was that the participants exhibited a genuine interest in learning CBA. 
Therefore, more time was spent “teaching” the decision-making methodology, rather 
than asking questions about its potential utility in making EBD decisions.  Out of respect 
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for the subjects’ time, interviews were strictly limited to one hour.  More time spent on 
the CBA exercise, meant fewer questions answered after the demonstration was 
completed. 
The first three to five minutes of the interview consisted of capturing the 
participants’ work experiences and qualifications.  They described their roles within the 
agency, and began to frame the experiential context and their familiarity, or lack thereof, 
with EBD.  Table 4.0 shows the demographic breakdown of the participants and lists 
their job title within the HFPA. 
 
Table 4.0 – Interview Participant Demographics 
 
After collecting the field notes, qualitative analysis was done using Grant 
McCracken’s five step analytic model for interviews as enumerated in The Long 
Interview (1988).  In it, he establishes a process to begin formulating conclusions from 
interview data harvested while taking notes or generating transcripts.  These five steps 
were completed for each of the ten HFPA subject matter experts: 
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Step 1). The interview field notes were thoroughly read, and additional notes 
made in the margins.  These additional notations capture what McCracken refers to as 
“utterances,” or short statements describing the key points of an interviewee’s 
soliloquies as they convey their thoughts (1988).  This is an opportunity for the 
interviewer to begin parsing out useful information, from that which does not pertain to 
the research topic, in the margins. 
Step 2).  Next, observations were grouped into descriptive categories.   In this 
case, an attempt was made to shape the responses to coincide with the research 
objectives about Lean Culture, CBA, and EBD.   
Step 3).  As the notes were reviewed, patterns began to emerge that allowed 
coding of the data.  Some of the responses were very easy to code, while others had to be 
scrutinized and paired with contextual information to derive the actual meaning of what 
the subject was trying to convey.  For instance, some questions were met with a simple 
“yes or no” answer, leaving no ambiguity to the meaning.  However, other questions 
were more opinion based, and required more scrutinized analysis of the participants’ 
statements to derive a conclusion. 
Step 4).  This step required the clustering of “utterances” into themes, or 
meaningful statements, that ran through the entire pool of respondents.  In this study, a 
simple “CBA,” “EBD,” or “LC” was placed by the phrases to code it for sorting. 
Step 5).  The final step was to collect data quotes that spelled out themes that 
were pervasive through the group.   As an example, when reviewing the notes pertaining 
to CBA, descriptive terms such as “tedious,” “cumbersome,” “complex,” and “time 
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consuming,” were frequently coded. In fact, CBA was one research area that was 
unambiguous.  0 out of 10 respondents had ever heard of CBA prior to the interview, 
and 8 out of 10 classified it as an “arduous” task (two respondents did not comment on 
the difficultly, or lack of difficulty, that they experienced with the CBA exercise). 
After the interview notes were organized, it became evident that the responses 
could generally be grouped into three broad categories: 
1. General EBD implementation observations and findings 
2. CBA perceptions, applicability, and likelihood of adoption 
3. Cultural findings (most important) 
It was not the intent of this study to collect empirical data to support, or validate, 
whether CBA was a viable tool to combat the trend of cost overruns and scheduling 
delays in military hospital construction.  Rather, the data of most value was the subjects’ 
feedback on the process, more so than on the numerical outcomes of the CBA exercises.  
The intent was to get to the heart of the decision-making challenges plaguing military 
hospital construction while also getting to the heart of the subject.  Through these 
interviews, the intricacies of building hospital campuses whose square footage numbers 
in the millions, and whose price tags can sometimes eclipse one billion dollars was 
evident.    Table 4.1 shows the general responses, formulated from pervasive themes and 






How are decisions between EBD 
intervention options made?
Knowledge is shared among planners and programmers 
through the AAR / Consultation (site visit) of a PM from 
another project.
Please describe the process of vetting 
EBD options and alternatives.
Recommendations are made based on adaptations from an 
existing hospital in the inventory, or the decision(s) are left to 
the PED Field Representative and the MTF Commander to 
make on site.
With whom do you consult (positional), 
and when (during the planning phases of 
construction) on EBD decisions?
Other PM's and MTF Commanders (User Representative); the 
Architect of the private firm on the project.
What are the metrics that validate design 
decisions and to whom do y 
ou answer about the efficacy of design? 
(Answers varied widely on this question).  No consensus, but 
some answers given were "patient satisfaction surveys", and 
"post-occupancy evaluation results".
How paramount a factor is Cost, in the 
implementation of a design decision? 
Answers seemed to be split into two camps:  Subordinate 
employees predominantly answered that "Cost is the #1 decision 
factor", while more senior agency members 
(presumably with a more strategic view) said, "EBD costs what 
ever it costs."
When programming a Military Hospital, 
“where do you start / what is the design 
point of departure” when selecting EBD 
interventions?
(Answers varied widely on this question) Some answers included 
the Whole Building Design Guide (design guide plates), the 
SEPS (Space and Equipment Planning System), or the UFC 
4-510-01 (Military Medical Facility Design Specs) 
What barriers (cultural, political, 
economic, etc.) have you encountered in 
implementing EBD interventions?
The majority of respondents answered that there are economic 
barriers and political barriers (though the term "political' was 
never defined).  None of the respondents cited cultural barriers.
Had you heard about Choosing-by-
Advantages before this interview? 8/10 answered "No".  2/10 did not provide an answer.
Do you feel there is a gap between the way 
a design is intended to function, and the 
way healthcare practitioners are actually 
operating in it?
7/10 answered "Yes", 2/10 answered "No", 1/10 answered 
"Unsure".  Answer indicates the majority of respondents feel 
that there is an operational disconnect between the hospital staff 
and their practices, relative to the built environment.
Table 4.1- Consolidated Answers to Interview Questions 
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Evidence-Based Design: General Findings 
      Ten years ago, the Army embarked on a journey to improve the standard of 
medical care that it was providing to its Soldiers and families in its built infrastructure.  
EBD seeks to use proven, evidence-based data, to shape both the quality, and safety, of 
the hospital environment.   In that regard, the Army’s newest hospital replacement 
facilities, and those hospitals that have been renovated under the MRR program, have 
succeeded.   However, the Army has adopted many of its “best-practices” from the 
health industry’s private sector.  While the efficacy of those designs are validated in 
civilian hospitals, it is assumed that they will have the same impact in military health 
facilities in some cases.  One anecdote that highlights the fallacy of that assumption, is 
the lack of use of the patient lifts at the new Fort Belvoir Community Hospital in 
Virginia.  During a Post Occupancy Evaluation, surveyors noted that the military nursing 
staff were not using the ceiling mounted lifts very regularly.  When they inquired why, 
the nurses cited two reasons:  1) The nursing staff felt they had a very good “team-lift” 
procedure to safely move patients without the use of patient lifts, and 2) they felt that the 
exercise that patients experienced while struggling to get to the bathroom, assisted by 
nursing staff, was in some ways rehabilitative and therapeutic.    
     A similar sentiment was expressed by one of the subjects of this study relative to 
an automated patient control system that was proposed for military hospitals.   These 
touch-screen tablet innovations in patient rooms enable the patient to watch movies on 
demand, call a nurse, adjust the window shades or room temperature, and Skype
® 
with 
their families.  In addition to that, the system was linked to the patient EHR, and the data 
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relative to their ailment would automatically adjust their menu options when ordering a 
meal through the system.  For instance, if the patient suffered from high cholesterol, only 
those meals designated as low cholesterol would be available on the digital menu board.  
The subject’s concern was twofold.  He asked rhetorically, “How are we going to keep 
our military nutritionists trained, since they will no longer have a job?” Then from a 
broader perspective he noted, “If we automate the whole hospital, the staff are no longer 
going to experience the human interface opportunities that develop their bed-side 
manner (Participant E, personal communication, January 13, 2017).”   This is an 
unintended EBD by-product in the military hospital that will need to be investigated.  
The sense of control that a patient feels they have over their situation, and their 
environment, can directly affect their level of stress, which can speed, or hinder, the 
healing process.  But, granting the patient ultimate control can in some ways write the 
clinician or medical practitioner out of the equation.   
      In the case of the Fort Belvoir nurses, they felt the use of patient lifts would have 
impeded an important team exercise that strengthened the bond between the nursing 
staff, and the bond between the patient and the nurses.   These bonding mechanisms are 
an important part of building the Lean culture in a hospital, which is a necessary 
component of EBD.  It remains to be seen whether the increased reliance on automation, 
and electronic innovation, will potentially be a detriment to the professional 
development of hospital staff in the long run, which would ultimately be self-defeating 
to the goal of maximizing the potential of the healing space. 
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      Military hospitals are, without question, better after the implementation of EBD 
than they were before it.   That said, there are many ways to improve the use of EBD 
during the programming phases of MTFs.  EBD is not the cause of any of the cost 
overruns or scheduling delays that are experienced in military hospital construction.   
Rather, the additional scrutiny placed on the design interventions results in more key 
design decisions having to be made, which introduces the possibility of additional 
variability to the time and schedule factors of a hospital project.  This can be avoided 
through more deliberate planning at the beginning of the project.   A more robust 
planning and programming effort before breaking ground, followed by a more rapid 
execution of the construction timeline, can minimize the loss of shared understanding of 
decisions and the effect on the continuity in management of a project due to military 
turn-over.   
      The length of time allowed to elapse between initial programming and project 
execution results in a very different operational landscape between EBD selection and 
EBD implementation.  This is due to several factors outside the span of control of a 
health facility developer.  One, is that medical technology innovation is outpacing the 
build time of most military hospitals.  Due to this immediate obsolescence of medical 
technology, there is virtually no way to avoid changes on a project that lasts five to 
seven years.  Another factor effecting design are the changes in geopolitical landscape 
that occur when key policy makers and military members retire or are replaced.  The 
change in operational tempo can also drive design changes.  For instance, if a military 
unit is slated to deploy to a theater of combat, or move to a different Army post due to 
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the Base Realignment and Closure initiative, it can change space utilization 
requirements, which impacts the hospital footprint.   A shift in focus of the type of 
medical care provided can also have an effect on the medical built environment.  As an 
example, the HFPA is currently assessing the possibility of reducing hospital space, and 
minimizing certain functional areas of a military hospital, due to an emphasis on 
telemedicine.  The Patient Centered Medical Home initiative seeks to offload the burden 
of the military hospitals by automating, and providing via the United States Postal 
Service and Video-Conferencing, recurring prescriptions, and non-emergent consultation 
with clinical providers.  This will have an effect on the throughput of military hospitals 
that will manifest itself in different Evidence-Based Design decisions being made on a 
military hospital project. 
 
 
CBA Perceptions and Applicability Findings  
With respect to CBA adoption, the general consensus among the subjects was 
that the process was “tedious.”  Given that the community is predominantly “behind 
schedule,” it would seem logical that inundating them with another complex tool would 
imply that more time would be taken to make EBD decisions – something they feel there 
is not enough of to begin with.  The challenge in this study was to illustrate CBA’s 
capability to speed up the selection process after the system is in place.  The theory is 
that once CBA evaluation tables have been built for all of the Design Drivers, very 
minor tailoring is required for them to account for each project’s peculiarities.  
Additionally, by capturing the design rationale for EBD decisions on a visual medium, 
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such as the CBA table, it would enable the design team to make selections from an 
advanced “point of departure.”  Meaning, the team would not be starting the EBD 
vetting process from scratch each time they began programming a new hospital and 
decision results from previous projects would be more readily available.   
 The subjects reviewed the CBA material and completed the CBA exercise, but 
few of them experienced a “lightbulb moment.”    While all of them agreed it refined the 
decision process, and would likely result in better continuity in EBD decision-making 
from one hospital to the next, they embraced CBA with guarded skepticism.   In 
retrospect, the example should not have been so realistic, which resulted in a fairly 
complex demonstration of CBA.  As with other Lean simulations, it is not uncommon to 
have to simplify the teaching moment for subjects to “get it.”  This was evidently the 
case with CBA.  It can be a relatively complex decision-making system, which fits 
within a larger cost programming framework (TVD).   The recommendation for future 
research would be to develop a more simplistic, iterative simulation that conveys the 
benefits of CBA through meaningful repetition.  Based on the study results from the ten 
subject matter experts within the HFPA, a single practical example is not likely to win 
the hearts and minds, nor promote adoption of any Lean programming tool, among a 
network of professionals who have been using other methodologies for their entire 
careers.  This illustrates the most important point.  Without evolving to a Lean 





Cultural Transformation Findings 
Because the United States armed forces have been engaged in protracted conflict 
for over 15 years, the state of high operational tempo has eroded the readiness, 
capability, and, in some cases, the productivity of the force over the last decade.  The 
negative effects on a war-weary workforce may be evident, due in part to a pernicious 
cycle of executing a wartime mission followed by stateside reset and recovery.   It was 
on the home-front that this degradation became most apparent.  In response to the 
decline in the efficiency of the Department of Defense, strategists at the Pentagon’s 
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff-Business Transformation Division began searching 
for solutions to the dwindling productivity.   On May 15, 2008 the DOD issued Directive 
number 5010.42. This directive served as a mandate to all DOD branches to establish a 
Continuous Process Improvement (CPI) and Lean Six Sigma (LSS) program which was 
to be the primary means to assess and continually improve the effectiveness and 
efficiency of DOD processes. The program’s initiative was to strengthen the military’s 
capabilities and improve the following lines of effort:  Productivity, Performance, 
Safety, Flexibility and Energy Efficiency (DOD Directive 2008).  This mandate would, 
of course, come with funding to support the educational and implementation 
requirements of such a program.   The rationale was that it sometimes costs money to 
save money, and ultimately improve the way the Army does business.  In accordance 
with Jeffrey Liker’s first principle of basing “management decisions on a long-term 
philosophy, even at the expense of short-term financial goals,” the DOD invested in 
Lean programs (2004, p. 37). CPI/LSS was the vehicle to achieve transformation, in 
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spite of a few inconsistencies in Lean philosophy when compared to the military 
hierarchical structure of making decisions and executing work.     
In fulfillment of the requirement, MEDCOM began a concerted effort to train 
and equip its workforce with the knowledge required to implement a CPI/LSS program.  
At Joint Base San Antonio, the MEDCOM Lean Six Sigma deployment director, and her 
colleagues, developed an academic pipeline to produce certified Lean Six Sigma leaders 
who could apply the waste mitigating and performance measurement techniques learned 
in the classroom to their respective organizations.  Lean operations became the gold 
standard in U.S. Army Medicine and while many systems were streamlined, and billions 
of dollars saved, there were still some aspects of the Lean philosophy that were 
incompatible with Army culture (Lopez 2016).  As the organization begins to apply 
Lean to more widespread facets of Army Medicine, specifically Health Facility 
Development and Military Medical Treatment Facility Construction, it will become even 
more important that we understand the dissimilarities between traditional Lean 
philosophy and current Army culture. 
To assess the military’s current capacity to implement Target Value Design and 
Choosing by Advantages to improve the way that EBD decisions are made, it is 
necessary to explore ways in which the military and Lean are compatible while striving 
to understand what cultural adaptations could be made to more effectively implement 
Lean.  The idea that parallels can be drawn between Lean and military strategy is not 
new.   
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       Low and Teo (2005) suggest that Lean production principles may have been 
influenced by Sun Tzu’s Art of War.  They did not analyze, however, how U.S. military 
culture may change the way Lean is implemented and enacted. While the United States 
Army has begun to implement Lean operations in the healthcare environment, it has yet 
to fully implement many of the tools at the disposal of a Lean Construction practitioner 
while undertaking military health facility development. Several peer-reviewed articles in 
The Military Engineer, the official professional journal of the Society of American 
Military Engineers, call for an over-haul of military construction delivery methodology.  
Specifically, Peter Cholakis, in his article “Rethinking Construction Delivery” (2015), 
contends that “Leaner” construction practices and tools such as BIM may be precisely 
what military constructors need to implement to ensure project success. Lean tools 
notwithstanding, in order to take full advantage of the methodology, an organization 
must adapt their culture, as necessary, to embrace a more Lean-centric way of thinking.  
Another objective of this study was to examine U.S. Army Medicine and, using The 
Toyota Way (Liker 2004) and Liker’s Management Principles, determine which of those 
principles are already being successfully implemented, while highlighting those that 
present a greater challenge. Table 4.2 lists those Toyota Way principles that the U.S. 
Army has already implemented, or already exhibits. 
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Table 4.2: Principles from Liker’s 14 Management Principles (Liker 2004) 
Principle 
Number 
Content Military Applicability Compatibility     




Make decisions slowly by 
consensus, execute 
rapidly 
Decision to invest in Lean 
Six Sigma 
Army post-war leadership 
transformation initiative 
Low / High 
Medium / Medium 
9 Grow Leaders with 
thorough understanding 
of the philosophy 
Formal pipeline to train 
Lean practitioners 






people and teams 
Become a learning 
organization 
Stop to Fix Problems 
Standardize Tasks / 
Continuous Improvement 
Professional Military 
Education focuses on 
developing people 
Assess current state and 
evolve to world class 
(healthcare) 




High / High 
Medium / High 
High / High 
High / Medium 
In this cultural exploration, only those principles that focus on the collaborative aspects 
of Lean will be addressed (i.e. those shown in Table 4.2).  Those principles that are more 
operationally oriented (i.e. process flow), and do not deal with building consensus or 
making decisions, have been omitted, and represent areas for further exploration. 
Managing Change 
The dichotomy of grooming leaders to give orders in a wartime environment 
compared to the way that same leader is asked to build consensus and make decisions in 
a peacetime environment is striking.  There is a time and place for consensus building.  
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The middle of a kinetic and tactical environment, where the stakes are life or death, is 
not necessarily one of them.  An entire generation of warfighters has been baptized in 
the crucible of combat, in some cases leading to a rigid and inflexible hierarchy resistant 
to soliciting ideas or innovation from its subordinates.  This is sometimes necessary in a 
combat environment, but can be detrimental to an organization in a stateside business 
environment.  In 2006, when General David Petraeus penned the U.S. Army 
Counterinsurgency Field Manual 3-24, he recognized then that even in tactical 
situations, soliciting bottom-up refinement can be a healthy, team-building event (FM 3-
24 2006).  The manual reads:  
 
Open channels of discussion and debate are needed to encourage growth of 
a learning environment in which experience is rapidly shared and lessons 
adapted for new challenges. The speed with which leaders adapt the 
organization must outpace insurgents’ efforts to identify and exploit 
weaknesses or develop countermeasures (p. 7-9). 
 
This concept is in line with Liker’s 13th Principle of “making decisions slowly by 
consensus, thoroughly considering all options; and implementing decisions rapidly” 
(Liker 2004).  “Speed” is a relative thing in a warzone, but the premise is that if the 
appropriate time is taken to discuss decisions with the team, trust is built.  With buy-in 
and trust built through consensus, a leader will more aptly be able to manage his or her 
team.  The same is true of decisions in Health Facility Development while conducting 
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peacetime operations.  Rather than decisions being made solely “at the top,” design and 
construction professionals should develop a network of decision makers to collectively 
agree on design interventions in military hospitals.  One of the organizational challenges 
that the U.S. Army has to overcome is that units (hospital organizations) experience 
fairly rapid turn-over.  On average, Commanders change command every two years, 
which often results in a changing of the guard in the middle of enduring multi-year 
megaprojects. Health Facility Developers who build a network of decision makers may 
preclude some of the issues that arise when a new Hospital Facility Commander takes 
command shortly before the commissioning of a new hospital.  There are occasions 
when the new commander decides to make sweeping changes to the design resulting in 
significant delays and cost overruns due to change-orders and rework.  When a design 
decision rests with “the team,” it is much harder for the “new Boss” to over-turn it.  With 
the implementation of Lean Six Sigma, organizations are having to address the impact of 
combat on leadership development, and critically assess how decisions are made.  This is 
a healthy exercise for an organization that is transforming to a more Lean and agile 
institution.   
 
Building the Bench 
The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) has a large role to 
play in the Lean transformation as well.  This major command is responsible for 
“training the force,” and manages all of the professional military education courses in 
the U.S. Army.  In these courses, student Soldiers learn through experiential case study, 
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and evolve as men and women who understand servant leadership.  Hard conversations 
are engaged in about the types of leaders whom they have served, and the leader that 
they have become, or wish to become.   Understanding culture is the foundation of the 
advanced courses, and white papers are studied relative to what it means to be in the 
Profession of Arms (TRADOC 2010). 
 In these environments, rank is metaphorically removed, and honest assessments 
about the state of the organization are given.  This is a crucial step in evolving as a Lean 
organization.  Leaders must be willing to accept, and even celebrate, failure in an effort 
to truly understand why a specific mission or business initiative did not go as planned.  
For more than a decade, the U.S. Army has embarked on this journey, only to battle a 
silent resistance to flattening the hierarchy.  Brilliant men and women who spent entire 
careers watching the evolution also acknowledge the need for change.  General Peter 
Chiarelli, the 32nd Vice Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army who served in that capacity from 
August, 2008 to January, 2012, made the following inference in his article on Modern 
Wars, implying inherent issues with current Army culture: 
 
The military must continually look at ways to flatten their organizational 
structures… increase opportunities – and rewards – for leaders to serve in 
assignments outside the traditional military structure…and then retain only 
those Americans who have the potential to succeed in tomorrow’s complex 
operating environments… they must ensure all views are welcomed to the 
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debate and that junior leaders have no fear of career retribution for freely 
stating their opinions.  (Chiarelli and Smith 2007 p. 41) 
 
The U.S. Army Field Manual 101-5 Chapter 5: “The Military Decision-making Process” 
(MDMP), which is taught extensively at TRADOC schools, describes in detail, the art 
and the science of decision-making (MDMP 1997).  It delineates between those things 
that can be operationally measured (the science), while acknowledging that there are 
other complex and intangible aspects of decision-making that are simply more subjective 
(the art), and rely on the decision maker having the experience, institutional knowledge, 
and leadership capability to execute the task.   The challenge for many army leaders, is 
taking a system (MDMP) designed to function in a tactical, or combat, environment, and 
adapting it to a stateside mission.  It is in this construct that CPI/LSS excels at bridging 
the gap, and enables teams to do the analysis necessary to build multiple courses of 
action to accomplish both business goals and combat missions.  Lean, and its philosophy 
of Continuous Improvement, champions the notion of measuring where you are at today, 
so that you can assess where you want to be tomorrow, and have the tools to implement 
the plan to get there.  Moreover, it does so by advocating a culture of cooperation and 
shared reward without sub-optimization between the various components of the 
organization.   This is one aspect of Lean at which the U.S. Army excels.  The Army 
mantra of “One Team, One Fight” is the phrase that best describes the willingness to 
selflessly operate in concert with sister units and organizations to accomplish a common 
goal, regardless of who is ultimately left paying the bill.  In this regard, the U.S. Army is 
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already well on its way to achieving Liker’s 9th and 10th principles of “growing leaders 
who thoroughly understand the work, and live the philosophy,” while “developing 
exceptional people and teams who follow your company’s philosophy” (Liker 2004).   
 
Climbing the Kaizen Stairway 
Another aspect of U.S. Army culture that is congruent with Liker’s 14th Principle 
of becoming a learning organization through relentless reflection (Hansei) and 
continuous improvement (kaizen) is the Army’s steadfast adherence to the practice of 
conducting After Action Reviews (AAR).  The tenets of conducting an AAR are simple.  
There are four questions asked in every discussion (TC 25-20 1993):   
1. What did we set out to accomplish? (Identify the objectives of the  
mission) 
2.   What actually happened? (Assess each phase of the mission) 
3.   Why did it happen?  (Without placing blame, assess what went well,  
      and what failed during the mission)   
4. What are we going to do next time? (What will change/remain the  
      same in the planning phases and process execution for the next  
      mission)  
 
The AAR is conducted per the guidance in U.S. Army Training Circular 25-20: “A 
Leader’s Guide to After Action Reviews,” by an objective third party, not one of the 
first-line leaders who led the mission (TC 25-20 1993).  Additionally, feedback from the 
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group begins with the lower ranking members first to prevent their opinions and 
observations from being over-shadowed by more senior ranking Soldiers.   A 
comprehensive list of “sustains” and “improves” for each phase are generated, and 
subsequently drafted into an executive summary for each mission conducted.  In rare 
cases (if mission execution was particularly poor), the facilitator may conduct separate 
sensing sessions with the different rank structures independently of one another.   This 
autonomy to critically examine the successes and failures of a mission is key to 
developing a cohesive unit where everyone, from the lowest ranking to the highest, feels 
like their vote matters.   This empowerment to shape operations is also important in 
establishing a sense of “ownership” in the organization through team endorsed, 
command level decisions.   The role of the Executive Director (Commander) is to then 
ensure that the next mission adheres to the best practices of the AARs that were 
generated by the team. Reading previous executive summaries of similar missions 
should be the first step a commander and his staff take when planning the current 
mission.  In this way, army units continue to climb the Kaizen Stairway (Rybkowski and 
Kahler 2014; Seed 2015) and solidify themselves as a “learning organization.”   
 
Becoming a High Reliability Organization 
Simply cataloging successes and failures through the AAR process is not enough 
to become great.  An organization must go further if it hopes to establish a climate where 
all employees truly feel empowered to make “on-the-spot” corrections of deficiencies, 
and in some cases halt the mission altogether.  This initiative has recently been 
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implemented in the operation of military hospitals under the command of Lieutenant 
General Patricia Horoho, the 43rd Surgeon General of the U.S. Army and previous 
Commander of MEDCOM.  In an effort to achieve High Reliability Organization (HRO) 
status, LTG Horoho began breaking down the barriers of rank structure and military 
hierarchy to reduce errors, and emphasized placing the customer (patient) first.   An 
HRO is defined as an organizational “environment of collective mindfulness in which all 
workers look for, and report, small problems or unsafe conditions before they pose a 
substantial risk to the organization, when they are easy to fix” (Weick and Sutcliffe 2007 
p. 38). 
The Army suggests there are three components to high reliability: continuous 
improvement, leadership development, and establishing a culture of safety that 
empowers everyone in the organization to make safety decisions (HRO 2014).  General 
Horoho was quoted while testifying to the Senate Committee for Defense Appropriations 
on the state of Army Medicine in March, 2015 as saying, “A High Reliability 
Organization is committed to achieving zero preventable harm by successfully limiting 
the number of errors in an environment where normal accidents can occur due to the risk 
factors and complexity of the practice” (Horoho 2015, p.17).  Part of the preventable 
harm solution is also designing military hospitals in such a manner as to assist 
practitioners and clinicians in this HRO commitment.  By “slowing down to get quality  
right the first time” and designing the ability to “detect problems” into the built 
environment (Jidoka and Liker’s 5th Principle), Army Medicine can achieve its HRO and 
world class healthcare goals (Liker 2004).    
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Standardization Is Key  
The final principle examined was Liker’s 6th principle that states that 
“standardized tasks and processes are the foundation for continuous improvement and 
employee empowerment” (Liker 2004).  This is another strong suit for the military.  The 
natural inclination for a military person is to execute tasks within a set framework of 
codified conditions and standards.  In fact, the U.S. Army has a Standard Operating 
Procedure (SOP) for virtually everything it does.  However, given the relative infancy of 
some of its Lean implementations, those SOPs, in some cases, are still in the process of 
being written.  There is precedent for developing SOPs to capture Lean mechanisms 
within the army culture and its operations.  The “Army Standardization Policy,” 
prescribes responsibilities for implementing standardized programs with respect to 
procedure, organizational operations, and training.  The proponent for this policy is the 
Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans headquartered at The Pentagon.  The 
Army defines standardization as “the management principle which fosters the 
development and sustainment of a high state of proficiency and readiness among 
Soldiers and units throughout an organization” (AR 34-4 1984).  The objectives of the 
policy are to improve the productivity and development of both the individual Soldier, 
and the team (unit) as a whole.  Due to reassignment of individual Soldiers throughout 
the Army every 2-3 years, it is also imperative that the Army standardize practices to 
reduce the adverse effects of personnel turbulence.  To that end, the Army refines its 
practices, and ensures that only those methods of practice that are fully vetted for 
efficacy endure from generation to generation.  These “best practices” are captured in 
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both Army policy (Army Regulation or “AR” manuals) and unit SOP manuals.  The 
delicate challenge is to ensure that while standardization serves as an integral part of the 
way the Army operates, that it does not stifle initiative or innovation.  Careful evaluation 
of the mechanisms for enforcement and current applicability of the standard is routinely 
scrutinized for relevancy as the mission, and the culture, changes.  This is very 
analogous to the concept of Climbing the Kaizen Stairway in which Rybkowski and 
Kahler (2014) suggest, “Effective use of collective kaizen and standardization capitalizes 
on the ability of individuals to innovate, to learn from one another, and to improve their 
effectiveness, thus helping managers improve time, cost, quality, safety and morale by 



















While the MHS has made a concerted effort to implement EBD since 2007, there 
exists much room for improvement before the optimal performance gains can truly be 
felt.  There is a significant departure between simply implementing the industry’s best 
design practices, and actually being an EBD practitioner.  As was denoted in Evidence-
Based Design: Application in the MHS (Malone et al., 2007), it takes growth and 
development of all three facets of Evidence-Based Design: environmental, cultural, and 
operational, before the healing spaces’ improved utility is felt by the most important 
customer, the patient.  The patient, in this case, happens to be the United States Soldier.  
Currently, the geopolitical climate is very “pro Soldier,” and many influential decision 
makers feel passionately about improving military healthcare.  While doing so, it is 
important to understand how the Soldier is effected by Evidence-Based Design 
decisions, and in what areas targeted interventions should be prioritized.   Figure 5.1, an 
adapted form of The Johns Hopkins’ Environment-Outcome Interface Model from 
Status Report (1998): An Investigation to Determine Whether the Built Environment 
Affects Patients’ Medical Outcomes, shows the segments of the hospital environment 
that can positively or negatively impact the Soldier, and the areas where evidence-based 
decisions must be made in order to maximize the quality of care in military hospitals 





Figure 5.1 – Soldier in the Center Concept, adapted from Rubin et al. 1998 
 
Unfortunately, little progress has been made in the arena of decision-making 
methodology tailored specifically to EBD in military hospitals.  The 2007 mandate of 
the implementation of these principles during the construction of all new MHS medical 
infrastructure has now yielded data that has not existed in the past.  Data collection 
opportunity not with-standing, it is still challenging to quantify the impact of EBD on 
health facilities due to their individual complexity and uniqueness.  This exploratory 
study aimed to answer the question, “Can Choosing by Advantages be used as the 
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backbone of the decision methodology by which Health Facility Developers select 
Evidence-Based Design interventions in Military Hospitals?”  The qualitative findings 
suggest that there would not be opposition to implementing a more comprehensive 
method of selecting EBD interventions, as long as it does not impose a time constraint to 
an already challenging schedule.  Furthermore, the subject matter experts agreed that the 
AAR is not necessarily the ideal method of applying lessons learned from one health 
facility project, to another.  A graphic representation of the rationale for a design 
decision assisted in solidifying a decision with the subject during the CBA Exercise, and 
improved the ability to articulate why a decision was made among a team, or to a third 
party.  Therefore, the study concludes that CBA as a bridging strategy between design 
professionals could be helpful in overcoming the knowledge gap created on project 
hand-off between outgoing and incoming personnel.  Furthermore, it would seem that a 
technical method of capturing EBD decisions, such as CBA, would be a better 
presentation medium of decision lessons learned to apply from one project to another, 
than simply a textual executive summary, or AAR.   In its current capacity, however, it 
seems that CBA is good for visualizing decisions that were made, and not as likely to be 
used to make future decisions (Participants, personal communication, January 20, 2017).   
The diverse mission set and culture of the Army will make it challenging, but not 
impossible, to adopt Lean construction practices such as TVD and subsequently, CBA.  
The duality of the stateside institutional army, versus the wartime operational army is a 
unique aspect of the business that must be overcome if the Army is to thrive in the EBD 
health facility market.  It is as though military organizations have to reinvent themselves 
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each time they deploy to a theater of combat, and then return to a stateside mission.  The 
application of Lean thinking and Lean managerial methodology is not necessarily 
possible in some tactical environments.  Furthermore, without a wholesale cultural 
transformation, it may be challenging for the U.S. Army to ever be a truly Lean 
organization philosophically, rather than merely an organization which happens to 
implement a few Lean techniques.   That said, there are many cultural norms in the 
Army that lend themselves quite well to fitting into the Lean organizational framework.  
In this study’s investigation into Army culture as part of a deeper dive into the 
requirements to successfully implement EBD in its hospitals, seven of the fourteen Lean 
principles were addressed, and deemed to correlate well with the attributes Liker says a 
Lean organization should exhibit.   A strong argument can be made that the other seven 
principles are at least partially fulfilled by certain facets of U.S. Army business.  Perhaps 
the current climate of proposed budget reduction is conducive to the Army’s willingness 
to implement more Lean cost saving measures.  As Womack and Jones (1996) wrote, 
“Lean provides a way to do more and more with less and less—less human effort, less 
equipment, less time, and less space—while coming closer and closer to providing 
customers with exactly what they want.” (p.36)  Unfortunately, in the same way that the 
construction industry has sometimes struggled to develop analogous systems to Toyota’s 
manufacturing processes, so too is the Army challenged with applying all of Liker’s 
Lean principles to its varied and diverse mission portfolio.  It is the researcher’s belief, 
that establishing the right culture is the underlying requirement necessary to implement  
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Lean Construction in general.  That is not to say some Lean tools, when implemented in 
spite of the culture, may still function to improve cost, schedule, and quality, but that is 
not the way it was necessarily intended to function.  Lean Construction, specifically, 
should be viewed as a system.  There is synergy in the system that cannot be realized by 
“cherry-picking” the programming tools that are needed to modify a particular aspect of 
the project, or simply to solve a specific problem.  One of the study’s objectives was to 
assess whether the Army culture had evolved to the point where LC could be 
implemented.  The conclusion here is that the Army is so diverse, and subordinate to so 
many other branches of government, that it would be extremely challenging to 
implement LC at the Army level.  Rather, LC would have to be adopted all the way up 
the civilian chain of command, through the U.S. Congress and the Budget 
Appropriations Committee, in order to be truly effective.  The timeliness, type (pool), 
and disbursement of money is a significant driver in the speed and efficiency with which 
military hospitals are, or are not, built.  Specifically with respect to EBD, research and 
development monies (a special pool of funds) would have to be earmarked within the 
heath facilities themselves to appropriately collect the data from which to generate future 
evidence.  Short of that, the Army will not be a true EBD practitioner.  Regardless, it is 
still well worth the effort to try to establish the Lean Army culture necessary to achieve 
optimal performance in an EBD health facility, to maximize the efficacy of those design 






 The U.S. Army has only recently begun to collect data from its hospital facility 
projects implementing EBD.  Therefore, little data or analysis exists cataloging the 
specific impacts of EBD in military medical treatment facilities to the military workforce 
or its patients.  While the Center for Health Design, in conjunction with the Georgia 
Institute of Technology, have developed cost-benefit and Return on Investment analysis 
(ROI) tables, there has been little progress in implementing the Post Occupancy 
Evaluations (POEs) that yield the EBD efficacy metrics, specific to the military 
population, that are needed to make informed design decisions.  Currently, performance 
data in the MHS is focused predominantly on the patient care experience and health 
outcomes affected by operations, rather than the impact of the built environment on 
patient health outcomes.  Therefore, the minimal review of only a few of the patient 
satisfaction survey data was hardly exhaustive enough to determine if sufficient data 
exists to build CBA Tables for all of the Design Drivers.  Only those data that were 
necessary to develop the CBA example for this study were harvested. 
 Were cost and time no factor, an attempt would have been made to interview far 
more HFPA, and non-HFPA, subject matter experts.  The pool of participants would 
have included members of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, members of the Defense 
Health Agency, and clinicians or practitioners of military hospitals, who also play a role 
in EBD decision-making.  Due to resource constraints, however, only ten participants 
were selected from the HFPA alone.     
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 Time was a much larger factor during the course of the interviews than was 
expected.  This was due to a complex CBA example being demonstrated before 
questions were asked.   The participants all learned at different rates, which resulted in 
several subjects spending most of the one hour interview period working through the 
CBA demonstration, rather than answering questions about EBD, or culture.  This 
resulted in incomplete data sets for some of the participants. 
  
Significance of the Study 
The significance of this study is that it tested the feasibility of implementation of 
a decision framework that could enable DOD policy makers and facilities developers to 
target specific design elements to achieve specific advantage per invested dollar results 
in military hospital facilities.  Most construction professionals would concur that it 
makes sense to base designs on evidence that suggests that those elements provide 
increased value to the customer throughout the life-cycle of the building (Rollins 2004).  
What is not entirely known, however, is whether those interventions that have been 
implemented since the MHS 2007 EBD mandate have actually yielded the expected 
results in military treatment facilities.  Due to the unique demographic, which includes 
an increased population of Wounded Warriors, who have additional orthopedic and 
psychological healthcare needs, research has yet to be conducted to validate that the U.S. 
Army’s Health Facilities Planning Agency is placing the appropriate design emphasis in 
the areas that will yield the highest ROI. The project’s long-term objective is to develop 
a series of CBA tables that will assist in making informed, fiscally responsible, 
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decisions, in all five EBD principle domains, that will add value to DOD healthcare 
environments and potentially those in the civilian sector as well.  This would enable 
HFPA members to: 
1) Maximize the value of the EBD intervention to the operators, and more 
importantly the patients, of Military Medical Treatment Facilities (MTF), to remain good 
stewards of fiscal resources while achieving world class healthcare. 
2) Begin to identify data gaps that need to be closed through Post 
Occupancy Evaluation, DMLSS databases, or Patient Satisfaction Surveys that would 
enable planners to assess EBD performance objectives in the military medical 
environment 
 
To do so, however, would require that the Army begin measuring what counts, 
which would entail a Post Occupancy Evaluation program overhaul.  Even if CBA is not 
adopted as an improved method of evaluating EBD decisions, there is real value in the 
dialogue that will be generated between the Lean Construction community and the 
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APPENDIX B 






Evidence Based Design / Choosing-by-Advantages Possible Questions 
 How are decisions between EBD intervention options made?
 Please describe the process of vetting EBD options and alternatives.
 With whom do you consult (positional), and when (during the planning phases of
construction) on EBD decisions?
 What are the metrics that validate design decisions and to whom do you answer
about the efficacy of design?
 How paramount a factor is Cost, in the implementation of a design decision?
 When programming a Military Hospital, “where do you start / what is the design
point of departure” when selecting EBD interventions?
 What barriers (cultural, political, economic, etc.) have you encountered in
implementing EBD interventions?
 Had you heard about Choosing-by-Advantages before this interview?
 Do you feel there is a gap between the way a design is intended to function, and
the way healthcare practitioners are actually operating in it?
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